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A. The Commission on Fair Market Value Policy 
for Federal Coal Leasing —  "The Linowes 
Commission"
1. In July, 1983 Congress directed the 
Secretary of the Interior to appoint a 
commission "to review the Department's 
coal leasing procedures to ensure 
receipt of fair market values". 1983 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 98-63 (1983).
2. Congress directed the Commission to 
address the following issues:
a. The methodology for estimating fair 
market value, including economic 
valuation methods, pre-sale versus 
post-sale analysis, and the value 
of independent and review 
appraisals.
b. The impact on competition and 
achieving fair market value of 
leasing large amounts of coal, 
particularly under depressed market 
conditions, versus a more moderated 
leasing schedule.
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c. Whether the leaseholder should 
share more in the risk of holding 
the lease by increasing rental 
rates, on a regionally adjusted 
basis.
d. Whether the public should share in 
the appreciation of the value of 
its resources by imposing a tax on 
transfers of surface or lease 
rights.
e. The methodology for assigning value 
to maintenance tracts, based on tlje 
value of the coal in the ground to 
the adjoining mine owner rather 
than as a "competitive" lease 
tract, when no competitive interest 
can be expected.
f. Possible methods of increasing 
competition, such as changing tract 
delineation methods, requiring 
meaningful fees to accompany 
expressions of interest, adopting 
intertract bidding procedures, or 
requiring a minimum number of bids 
in order to have a competitive 
sale.
g. Methods of evaluating tracts to 
reflect regional differences in
-6-
coal, and establishing 
cents-per-ton minimums on a 
regional basis.
h. Whether pre-sale planning 
procedures are adequate, 
particularly with regard to 
land-use planning, public 
participation, and the role of the 
Regional Coal Teams in determining 
the timing and amount of leasing.
i. Methods of carrying out authorized 
exchanges so as to minimize adverse 
effects on sales competition.
3. The Commission was created largely in
response to the controversy surrounding 
the 1982 Powder River Basin coal lease 
sale, in which lands containing an 
estimated 1.6 billion tons of coal were 
leased for a total bonus bid value of 
$67 million.
a. A report by the House
Appropriations Committee Staff in 
April 1983 concluded that the 
Powder River Basin coal leases were 
sold for $60 million less than fair 
market value, due in part to poor 
economic conditions, a "soft" coal 
market, and lack of bidding
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competition.
b. A report by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) in May, 1983 concluded 
that leases were sold for roughly 
$100 million less than fair market 
value, due in part to lack of 
competitive bidding, and 
recommended that Congress authorize 
the Department to negotiate lease 
sales.
4. In its February 1984 report, the 
Commission made some 36 recommendations 
to enhance the management of federal 
coal leasing program and improve the 
prospects for recovery of fair market 
value. These recommendations were 
divided into six major categories:
a. Coal Leasing Levels
b. Tract Selection Process
c. Coal Lease Sales Procedures
d. Appraisal Methods
e. Key Statutory and Related Factors
f. Organization and Management
5. On March 19, 1984 Secretary Clark 
released Interior's response to the 
Commission report, in which he accepted 
and agreed to implement 28 of the 30 
recommendations that did not require
-8-
action by Congress.
a. Interior rejected Recommendation
VI- 6, that bidders for federal coal 
leases should, provide confidential 
data on prices and other terms of 
private coal transactions to 
Interior for use in comparability 
analysis, preferring to rely on 
voluntary data submittal.
b. Interior rejected Recommendation
VII- 5, that the base for 
calculating federal royalty 
payments should be F.O.B. price 
minus all state and local severance 
and similar taxes, as inconsistent 
with Departmental treatment of 
other leasable minerals and other 
costs included in the "value" basis 
for royalty purposes, and 
recommended that the issue be 
studied and addressed by Congress.
c. Proposed guidelines and regulations 
implementing the recommendations 
were published for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 31, and 
November 1, 1984.
B. Environmental Protection in the Coal Leasing 
Program - The OTA Report
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1. Shortly after creating the Linowes 
Commission, Congress directed the Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) to assess 
the federal coal leasing program's 
"ability to ensure the development of 
coal leases in an environmentally 
compatible manner." (H. Rep. No.
98-399, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 22).
2. The OTA report identified 10 policy 
options that would "help to insure 
environmental protection and compliance 
with existing statutory mandates, reduce 
the environmental risk of leasing 
decisions, maintain a predictible and 
stable leasing process, and restore 
public confidence in the environmental 
soundness of the leasing program."
(OTA Report, p. x).
3. On July 9, 1984, Secretary Clark 
proposed procedures to respond to OTA's 
recommendations, primarily by improving 
data adequacy and decentralizing the 
decisionmaking process.
C. In February 1985, Interior published a 
supplemental DEIS on the Federal Coal 
Management Program. The proposed action 
would continue the program while 
incorporating decisions made or proposed in
-10-
response to the recommendations of OTA, the 
Linowes Commission, and Interior's program 
review.
II. MAJOR PROGRAM ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF 
FEDERAL COAL LEASING
A. Fair Market Value (FMV) - Definitional
problems with fair market value have created 
confusion and undermined public confidence in 
the program.
1. FCLAA requirement: "No bid shall be
accepted which is less than the fair 
market value, as determined by the 
Secretary, of the coal subject to the 
lease." (30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).)
a. FMV is not defined in FCLAA or 
legislative history.
b. Legislative history indicates 
strong congressional concern with 
FMV and a belief that FCLAA changes 
(competitive bidding requirement, 
rental and royalty rate charges, 
elimination of preference right 
leasing) would help ensure a fair 
return to the public. (S. Rep. No. 
94-296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975); H. Rep. No. 94-681, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).)
2. The legal standard for fair market value
-11-
is found in the relatively
well-developed body of case law dealing
with taxation and eminent domain/ i.e. ,
the amount a hypothetical buyer, willing
but not obligated to buy, would pay to a
hypothetical seller, willing but not
obligated to sell. See, e.g., Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934);
United States v. Branch Coal Corp. 285
F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd 411
F.2d 601 (3rd Cir. 1964)
a. Administrative agencies routinely \
determine fair market value in
condemnation proceedings:
Under established law the 
criterion for just compen­
sation is the fair market 
value of the property at the 
time of the taking. "Fair 
market value" is defined as 
the amount in cash, or on 
terms reasonably equivalent to 
cash, for which in all proba­
bility the property would be 
sold by a knowledgeable owner 
willing but not obligated to 
sell to a knowledgeable 
purchaser who is desired but 
is not obligated to buy. In 
ascertaining that figure, 
consideration should be given 
to all matters that might be 
brought forward and reasonably 
be given substantial weight in 
bargaining by persons of 
ordinary prudence, but no 
consideration whatever should 
be given to matters not 
affecting fair market value. 
(Interagency Land Acquisition 
Conference, Uniform Apparisal
-12-
Standards for Federal Land 
Acquisitions, U.S. Gov't. 
Printing Office, Stock No. 
052-059-00002-0. (1973).)
b. "Fair" is generally understood to
refer to the market (i.e., lack of 
compulsion or "fair market condi­
tions"), as well as the method for 
determining market value and the 
factors or circumstances to be 
"fairly" considered (i.e. , "market 
value fairly determined"). (United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 
(1943); Olson v. United States, 292 
U.S. 246 (1934); Heiner v. Crosby, 
24 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1928).)
c. Where there is "no market", assump­
tions must be made concerning the 
hypothetical market and factors 
that would be considered by 
knowledgeable and willing buyers or 
sellers.
d. The fair market value standard does 
not require that the government 
exploit its near monopoly position 
in western coal to maximize federal 
revenues. (California v. Watt, 712 
Fed. 2d 584, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(rejecting challenge to OCS oil and 
gas leasing program based on
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assertion that large lease offer­
ings and accelerated rate of 
leasing reduced lease bids below 
fair market value, where Secretary 
relied on competitive bidding and 
limited post-sale evaluation to 
assure receipt of fiar market 
value).)
e. Interiors failure to receive fair 
market value in the 1982 Powder 
River Basin lease sale is being 
asserted in pending litigation. 
(National Wildlife Federation v. 
Burford, Civil No. 82-117 (D.
Mont
3. As an economic concept, fair market 
value is inherently imprecise and
I
changes from time to time to reflect 
bidders expectations about future coal 
prices, mining revenues and costs, and 
developmental risks associated with 
government regulation or lease terms, 
a. Although coal supply markets are 
generally considered competitive, 
there are unique problems in 
applying the concept of market 
value as determined by a 
competitive market to federal coal
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leasing, (e.g., the extent of 
federal control of western coal, 
the 10-year moratorium on coal 
leasing, the dramatic increase in 
federal coal royalties, surface 
owner consent requirements, the 
10-year diligence requirement, lack 
of comparable sales in certain coal 
regions, lack of competitive 
bidding for leases - particularly 
maintenance tracts). 
b. From an economic viewpoint, lease 
rentals and production royalties 
should be included in determining 
fair return to the public for coal 
leases.
4. Recognizing the inherent difficulties in 
determining fair market value for 
federal coal leases, the Linowes 
Commission recommendations focused on 
improved appraisal methods and program 
changes needed to increase competition.
B. Leasing Levels - Leasing levels have become 
the focus of debate regarding both fair 
market value and environmental protection.
1. While the Linowes commission did not
attempt to determine the precise weight 
the Secretary should give to the impact
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of leasing levels on the determination 
on fair market value, it concluded that 
this impact could not be disregarded, 
and recommended:
a. Interior should not seek to raise 
coal prices above competitive 
market levels by limiting federal 
coal leasing, nor should it flood a 
depressed market. (Recommendation 
III-3)
b. The quantity of coal leased should 
be determined so as to achieve a l 
fair return consistent with other 
policy objectives, such as 
efficient land use, environmental 
planning, and conserving coal for 
the future. (Recommendation III-5)
c. Pending preference right lease 
applications contribute to 
uncertainty regarding appropriate 
leasing levels and processing of 
PRLA's should be rapidly completed. 
(Recommendation III-6).
2. OTA concluded that high leasing rates 
overtaxed the ability of BLM to 
adequately assess the environmental 
acceptability of proposed lease tracts, 
and recommended lower leasing rates to
-16-
reduce the probability that 
environmentally sensitive tracts would 
be leased.
3. The need for additional federal coal 
leasing and determinations of leasing 
levels were key issues in the NRDC 
challenge to the 1976 coal program.
(NRDC v. Hughes ,437 F. Supp. 981 
(D.D.C. 1977), modified 454 F. Supp. 148 
(D.D.C. 1978).
4. The debate over "leasing for production 
demand" versus "leasing for reserves" 
has been revived by the 1985 
supplemental DEIS.
C. Data Adequacy and Land Use Plans - Lack of 
adequate data for coal leasing decisions is 
perceived to be a major obstacle to an 
economically and environmentally sound 
leasing program.
1. The Linowes Commission identified the
lack of adequate coal resource data as a 
problem affecting: a) accuracy of tract
delineation, b) Interior's appraisal of 
fair market value, and c) potential 
competitive bidding on lease tracts. 
(Linowes Report, 178).
a. The commission concluded that 
federally-funded exploration 
encourages industry interest and
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bidding competition for new 
production lease tracts, and is 
virtually mandated by FCLAA.
b. The Commission recommended that
Interior sponsor more drilling for 
use in tract delineation and 
encourage cooperative drilling by 
industry. (Recommendation IV-2).
2. OTA concluded that the data and analysis 
supporting land use planning and leasing 
decisions should be improved to reduce 
environmental risk and restore public 
confidence.
a. OTA recommended incorporation of 
regulatory guidelines and standards 
for adequacy of presale data and 
analysis at all stages in the 
leasing process.
b. OTA also recommended incorporation 
of a "threshold" concept for 
estimating cumulative impacts 
during land use planning, tract 
ranking, and EIS preparation.
3. The adequacy of land use plans to 
support federal coal leasing decisions 
is being challenged in litigation over 
the 1982 Power River Basin lease sale. 
(National Wildlife Federation v.
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Burford, No. 82-117 (D. Mont.) and
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Watt, No. 
82-116 (D.Mont.).)
D. Checkerboard Ownership Patterns and Railroad 
Leasing - The stalement over railroad leasing 
of federal coal and fee coal exchanges by 
railroads impedes development and affects 
fair market value for federal coal resources.
1. Section 2(c) of the 1920 Mineral Leasing 
Act prohibits federal coal leasing by 
railroads. (30 U.S.C. 202).
2. The Linowes Commission took no position 
on repeal of Section 2(c), but concluded 
that steps should be taken to facilitate 
development of federal coal in railroad 
checkerboard areas, specifically:
a. Cooperative leasing procedures 
should be implemented to enhance 
competition for fragmented federal 
coal holdings (Recommendation
IV-3);
b. The exchange of federal and 
non-federal coal tracts should be 
pursued in a vigorous but prudent 
manner to consolidate coal holdings 
into logical mining units. 
(Recommendation IV-4).
3. Interior's authority to make fee
-19-
exchanges with railroads is being 
challenged in pending litigation. 
(Northern Plains Resources Council v.
Clark, _____ )
E. Statutory Problems
1. Diligence - The rigid 10-year diligent
development requirement of FCLAA reduces 
the market value of federal coal leases 
and may encourage lessees to develop 
coal leases prematurely.
a. The Linowes Commission recommended 
that Congress amend FCLAA § 7 to:
1) allow a 10-year extension for 
post-1976 leases by payment of 
escalating advance royalties, 
(Recommendation VII-7) and
2) require payment of advance 
royalties to maintain pre-1976 
leases for 10 years beyond 
lease readjustment. 
(Recommendation VII-2)
b. Requiring advance royalties or 
escalating "incentive" rentals on 
pre-1976 leases would eliminate the
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need for FCLAA's § 3 diligence 
provision (which disqualifies 
holders of nonproducing federal 
coal leases from acquiring new 
mineral leases under the 1920 
Mineral Leasing Act after 1986.)
c. Congress is currently considering a 
number of bills that would change 
the diligence provisions of FCLAA § 
3 and § 7.
2. Royalty Rates - FCLAA's mandated minimum 
royalty of 12% percent on all surface 
mined coal may not be appropriate for 
all coal regions.
a. The Linowes Commission recommended 
that Congress consider giving the 
Secretary administrative discretion 
to reduce federal royalty rates 
prior to a lease sale, where 
current royalty rates would have 
adverse effects on resource 
production. (Recommendation 
VII-4).
b. In some regions, federal royalty 
rates exceed competitive royalties 
on private and state coal leases, 
resulting in reduced competition 
and lower bids for federal coal 
leases.
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c. Variable royalty rates can cause 
economic inefficiencies in coal 
production patterns.
d. The Secretary has authority to
1
reduce royalty rates on existing 
leases "for the purpose of 
encouraging the greatest ultimate 
recovery of coal" and "in the 
interest of conservation of natural 
resources" under certain circum­
stances. (30 U.S.C. 209)
3. Surface Owner Consent - Legislative
changes are needed to reduce uncertainty 
and assure fair market value for federal 
coal leases.
a. The Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) 
requires written surface owner 
consent by qualified surface owners 
prior to lease of federal reserved 
coal. 30 U.S.C. § 1304(c).
b. The Linowes Commission concluded 
that substantial payments for 
surface owner consent have the 
effect of depressing bids for 
federal coal. (Linowes Report ,
312)
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c. The Commission recommended that 
Congress reexamine the need for 
limitations on payments to surface 
owners. (Recommendation VII-3)
4. Negotiated Sales - Due to lack of
competition and comparable sales for 
"captive" maintenance and bypass lease 
tracts, Interior should have authority 
to negotiate lease sales in limited 
circumstances.
a. FCLAA requires that federal coal 
leases be awarded by competitive 
bidding. (30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).)
b. Negotiated sales "at fair market 
value" are permitted for removal of 
coal necessary and incidental to 
the exercise of a right-of-way 
issued pursuant to FLPMA. (30 
U.S.C. § 201 (a)(1), Public L. No. 
95-554, October 30, 1978).
c. The Linowes Commission recommended that 
where reasonable efforts to obtain 
competitive bids fail, Interior should 
have authority to negotiate a fair 
price. (Recommendation V-6).
-23-
III. RELATED POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF COAL
LEASING
A. Energy Policy and Demand Forecasts - The 
uncertainty of demand forecasts for coal, 
particularly western coal, complicates any 
attempt to establish federal leasing levels.
1. Factors affecting the uncertainty of
coal projections include economic growth 
rates, conservation trends, world oil 
prices, coal transportation rates, acid 
rain legislation, and synthetic fuels 
development. (See, e .g,, Energy 
Outlook)
a. The demand for coal is largely a 
function of electricity demand, 
since 85% of domestic coal use is 
for electricity generation,
i
amounting to 53% of total 
electrical generation.
b. While coal is our most abundant 
fossil fuel, representing 85% of 
total U.S. fossil fuel reserves, it 
provided only 23% of U.S. energy 
consumption in 1984.
c. Coal is the least expensive fossil 
fuel on a BTU-equivalent basis.
d. Assumptions regarding world oil 
prices and economic growth rates
-24-
affect coal demand forecasts.
1. Low oil prices stimulate 
economic growth and demand for 
electricity.
2. The importance of oil prices 
to electricity demand 
outweighs the effect of 
substituting coal for oil when 
prices are high.
3. EIA expects oil prices to 
increase gradually from $28 
per barrel to $40 per barrel 
($1984) in 1995, which is 
below the 1980 price in real 
terms.
4. By 1995, net oil imports are 
expected to be double the 1983 
level, or about the same as 
1978 levels.
2. Total coal production is expected to
grow at an annual rate of 3.6% over the 
next 10 years, from 900 million tons in 
1985 to 1.2 billion tons in 1995. (See 
attached Table 1) .
a. The 322 ton-per-year increase is
nearly evenly divided between east 
and west, although the percentage 
increase is higher for the west.
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b. DOI forecasts show no significant 
differences in total or regional 
coal production between its 
proposed action (i.e. , continued 
federal coal leasing) and the no 
action alternative (no new federal 
leasing) at medium production 
levels. (DEIS, 90)
3. Foreign coal imports may pose a threat 
to expanded domestic coal production. 
(U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Potential for 
U.S. Steam Coal Imports (April 1985).)
a. Coal from Columbia, Canada, 
Australia, Poland and South Africa 
can be delivered to U.S. utilities 
at lower prices than many U.S. 
coals.
b. The potential for displacement of 
domestic coal production by 1990 
ranges from 6.4 million tons to 40 
million tons, with a most likely 
limit of 17.7 million tons.
c. The impact of imports could be 
greatest for Wyoming and Montana 
(9.8 of the 17.7 million tons), 
where subbituminous coals can be 
displaced by Columbian coal with 
equally low sulfur but a higher
-26-
heat content.
d. The number of jobs displaced by 
coal imports ranges from 1120 to 
2780.
B. "Acid Rain" Legislation - Proposed
legislation for control of sulfur dioxide 
(SC^) emissions from power plants could 
result in shifts in regional coal production.
1. The 1983 "Sikorski/Waxman Bill" (H.R.
3400) would require a 10-million-ton
reduction in SC>2 emissions from existing
sources by 1993.
a. A trust fund generated by a fee of 
1 mill per kilowatt hour on 
non-nuclear generated electricity 
would be used to reimburse 90 
percent of capital expenditures for 
scrubber retrofit of 50 largest 
emitters.
b. By mandating retrofit scrubbers , 
this approach minimizes regional 
shifts in coal production and 
employment.
c. Analysis by DOE indicates the bill 
would increase western coal 
production by 23 million tons and 
reduce eastern coal production by 2 
million tons in 1995. Increased
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low sulfur coal production in 
Central Appalachian (West Virginia, 
eastern Kentucky, Tennessee and 
Virginia) would partially offset 
reductions in other eastern states. 
(Energy Information Administration, 
Analysis of HR 3400t National Acid 
Deposition Control Act of 1983,
July 17, 1984).
Under a "cost effective equivalent" 
strategy, decreases in high-sulfur coal 
production in Northern Appalachia and 
the Midwest of 74 million tons per year 
would be offset by increases in low 
sulfur coal from Central Appalachia for 
a net gain of 43 million tons; while 
western coal production increases by 427 
million tons. (ICF Inc., Analysis of 
the Waxman-Sikorski Sulfur Dioxide 
Emission Reduction Bill (H.R. 3400) 
(April 1984).)
Fuel switching to low-sulfur coal under 
a least-cost approach is very sensitive 
to rail transportation rates. (EIA, 
Imports of Proposed Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1982 on the Coal and 
Electric Utility Industries (June
1983).)
C. Transportation Issues - Increased rail rates 
under deregulation and defeat of eminent 
domain legislation for coal slurry pipelines 
have reduced the competitiveness of western 
coal.
1. Delivered coal prices (in real terms) to 
utilities increased by about 17 percent 
over the past 10 years, primarily due to 
transportation rates, as real mine mouth 
prices decreased. (Energy Outlook)
2. The Linowes Commission recommended that 
Congress consider instituting a review 
to assess whether shippers of federal 
coal are adequately protected from 
anti-competitive or discriminatory 
practices. (Recommendation VII-6).
3. A recent analysis indicates that coal
users could save between $200 million 
and $1 billion in 1995 if four slurry 
pipelines were built. EIA, Coal Slurry 
Pipelines: Impact on Coal Markets
(April 1985).
a. Only minor shifts in regional coal 
production would occur.
b. Although railroad revenues would be 
reduced by 8%, railroad revenues
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from coal hauling would still be 
one half to two-thirds greater than 
those of 1984.
4. ICC recently suffered a setback to its 
railroad deregulation efforts when 
decisions deregulating coal exports and 
joint boxcar rates were overturned.
(ICC v. Coal Exporters Ass'n, 745 F.2d
76 (1984), cert, denied , ____  S. Ct.
____ April 29, 1985); ICC v. Brae Corp.,
740 F.2d 1023 (1984), cert, denied, ____
S. Ct. ___  (April 29, 1985).)
5. The current view of market dominance 
gives little protection to shippers.
(E.g., Western Coal Traffic League v. 
United States, 719 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 
1983), cert, denied, 104 S. Ct. 2160 
(1984).)
6. Two different legislative approaches are 
being pursued by shippers in Congress:
a. Reregulation by I.C.C. of rail 
rates under certain circumstances 
(e.g. \ "CURE" proposal).
b. Trackage rights and antitrust 
amendments (Railroad Antimonopoly 
Act of 1985, S. 447 & H.R. 1140)
Research & Development Policies and
Commercialization of Clean Coal Technologies
1. "Clean Coal Initiatives" - In 1984 
Congress directed the Secretary of 
Energy to solicit proposals for projects 
employing emerging clean coal 
technologies, and report to Congress on 
DOE’s assessment of each technology and
o
"the extent to which federal incentives, 
including financial assistance, will 
accelerate the commercial availability 
of these technologies." (Pub. L. No. 
98-476, 98 Stat. 1874) .
a. While no funds were appropriated to 
DOE, Congress indicated an intent 
to base FY 1986 funding decisions 
on the report.
b. DOE evaluated 175 responses from 28 
states involving flue gas cleanup, 
fluidized bed combustion, 
gasification, liquefcation, 
combined cycle turbines, etc.
c. DOE concluded that federal 
incentives are unnecessary and 
could adversely affect free market 
forces, which "are operating to 
select and commercialize the most 
efficient and environmentally 
effective technologies." (U.S. 
Dept, of Energy, Report to Congress
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on Emerging Clean Coal Technologies 
(May 1985).
2. Industry and other groups have supported 
government cost-sharing amounting to 
$750 million over the next five years to 
close the "technology gap" in 
commercialization efforts.
3. Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) 
remains moribund, and SFC funded 
projects are facing financial and 
technical difficulties (See, e.g,, GAO, 
Financial Status of the Great Plains 
Coal Gasification Project (February 21, 
1985).
E. National Coal Council
1. Then-Secretary of Energy Don Hodel 
established the National Coal Council in 
October 1984 to provide recommendations 
to the executive branch on government- 
industry cooperation in coal-related 
matters.
2. The Coal Council is patterned after the 
National Petroleum Council established 
in 1946.
3. A total of 113 charter members have been 
appointed, with former Virginia Governor 




A. Legislative changes recommended by the 
Linowes Commission are needed to increase 
competition , assure receipt of fair market 
value, and improve the efficiency of the coal 
leasing program.
B. Recent and proposed program change should 
satisfy most program cities, although 
ideological differences and east/west 
politics will remain.
C. The future of federal coal leasing will be 
influenced by related federal policy issues 
such as transportation regulation, coal 
imports, acid rain legislation, and R&D 
policy.
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Appalachian 460 632 725
Midwestern 193 307 405
Western 256 365 450
TOTAL 909 1304 1580
2DOI
Appalachian 455 592 652
Midwestern 180 224 231
Western 265 413 484
TOTAL 900 1229 1367
DRI3 4
Appalachian 432 521 607
Midwest 200 261 314
Western 271 384 453
TOTAL 903 1166 1385
4DOE
East of 
Mississippi 571 731 —
West of 
Mississippi 328 490 —
TOTAL 899 1221 /
1. Medium Forecast DOI, DEIS (February 1985).
2. Medium Forecast DOI, Production Forecast Technical Report 
(March 1985).
3. Data Resources Inc.
!
4. EIA, Annual Energy Outlook (1984).
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